Time and Utopia: the gap between Morris and Bax

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William Morris’s personal friendship and close working relationship with Ernest Belfort Bax is problematic for many Morris scholars. As Roger Aldous has persuasively argued, Bax’s reputation as a misogynist and his well-known dispute with Eleanor Marx Aveling on the question of women’s emancipation have badly sullied his standing in socialist circles, notwithstanding the originality and richness of his thought; the risk that Morris might be tainted by association helps explain Bax’s neglect in Morris studies and, indeed, the desire on the part of leading Morris scholars to emphasise the incongruence of their collaboration. Yet Aldous’s conclusion that that the differences between Morris and Bax ‘are more than outweighed by similarities’ seems too strong. In contesting this claim, I examine Morris and Bax’s concept of time. I argue that there was an important difference in their understanding of historical change, and that the gap between them pointed to an important contrast in the approach they adopted toward the future.

Their joint statement in the second edition of the Manifesto of the Socialist League (1885) is a useful starting point for discussion. Here, Morris and Bax describe history as a dialectical, spiralling movement:

… we look forward to the time when any definite exchange will have entirely ceased to exist; just as it never existed in that primitive Communism which preceded Civilisation.

The enemy will say, ‘This is retrogression not progress’; to which we answer, All progress, every distinctive stage of progress, involves a backward as well as a forward movement; the new development returns to a point which represents the older principle elevated to a higher plane; the old principle reappears transformed, purified, made stronger, and ready to advance on the fuller life it has gained through its seeming death. As an illustration (imperfect as all illustrations
must be) take the case of advance on a straight line and on a spiral, – the progress of all life must be not on the straight line, but on the spiral.³

The body of this paper considers the ways in which this common idea played itself out in Morris and Bax’s single-authored work. My contention is that whilst they were able to generalise their positions in important jointly-authored work, their ideas differed in significant ways. Since Morris and Bax drew attention to the convergence of their views, pointedly describing Socialism: Its Growth and Outcome (1896) as ‘a collaboration’ in ‘the true sense of the word’, ‘each sentence having been carefully considered by both the authors in common’, the claim is perhaps foolhardy.⁴ Nevertheless, my suggestion is that Morris and Bax read different ideas into the framework of the theory of change, and that they not only held divergent views about the dynamics of history, but that this divergence suggested an important difference in their respective assessments of history’s epistemic value, which were also therefore incompatible. The depth of this disagreement was made plain by the attitudes they took towards the role of utopianism in socialist thought – an issue I consider at the end of the paper.

I. SOCIALISM AND ETHICS

One of the key tenets of Morris and Bax’s socialist thought was the idea that, as well as the transformation of the socio-economic system, the transition from capitalism to socialism involved an ethical change. During the early 1880s, this conviction was expressed in their commitment to ‘the religion of socialism’, a concept which, as Anna Vaninskaya has shown, was open to a wide variety of competing interpretations.⁵ For Morris and Bax, it underpinned a shared belief that the primary purpose of socialist activism was not a push for immediate ‘practical’ reform, but to ‘make socialists’. Socialism, they argued, was not just a system of production, distribution and exchange, but described a set of social relations and a particular moral consciousness. Finding insufficient support for this view in the Social Democratic Federation (S.D.F.), and quarrelling with H.M. Hyndman on the question of socialist strategy, in 1884 Morris and Bax left the S.D.F. to found the Socialist League.⁶ Free there to determine their own priorities, they included this statement in the Manifesto:

A new system of industrial production must necessarily bear with it its own morality. Morality, which in a due state of Society … mean[s] nothing more than the responsibility of the individual man to the social whole of which he forms a part …

The economical change which we advocate, therefore, would not be stable

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unless accompanied by a corresponding revolution in ethics, which, however, is
certain to accompany it, since the two things are inseparable elements of one
whole, to wit social evolution.  

Bax and Morris linked the ethic of socialism with justice and both grounded
it in sentiment. For Bax, justice was underpinned by solidarity or brotherhood.
By invoking this term, Bax did not mean to suggest that communism implied
‘an equally close personal affection for, or intimacy with, everybody’ — a notion
he thought absurd — but ‘the practical recognition of mutual sympathy in the
affairs of life and in the recognition of the same ideal aims’.  Morris similarly
rooted socialist ethics in feeling, and described its expression in a number of ways.
In News From Nowhere the ethical principle is characterised as one of kindness
to strangers. In his correspondence with the Rev. Bainton, Morris echoed the
terms of the Manifesto to describe it as a ‘religious sense of the responsibility of
each man to each and all of his fellows’ or ‘the habitual love of humanity’. In his
story of the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381, The Dream of John Ball, he identified socialist
ethics with fellowship, using the Judeo-Christian term to describe a sense of
belonging to an earthly community:

Forsooth, ye have heard it said that ye shall do well in this world that in the world
to come ye may live happily for ever; do you well then, and have your reward
both on earth and in heaven; for I say to you that earth and heaven are not two
but one … Forsooth, brethren, will ye murder the Church any one of you, and go
forth a wandering man and lonely … what an evil doom is this, to be an outcast
… to have none to love you and to speak with you, to be without fellowship! For-
sooth brothers, fellowship is heaven, and lack of fellowship is hell: fellowship is
life, and lack of fellowship is death: and the deeds that ye do upon the earth, it is
for fellowship’s sake that ye do them, and the life that is in it, that shall live on and
on for ever, and each one of you part of it, while many a man’s life upon the earth
from the earth shall wane.

II. ETHICS AND THE DYNAMIC OF HISTORY

So-describing the principles of socialist ethics, Bax and Morris agreed that ethical
change was part of a wider process of historical development. Both, moreover,
understood it as a dialectical process. Of the two, Bax’s view was by far the more
elaborate. His sociological analysis mapped three different models of social rela-
tions – or what he called expressions of consciousness – on to complementary
systems of moral and religious thought. Using the terminology which had found
its way into the Manifesto, he dubbed these models ‘primitive’ or ‘natural’ com-
munism, individualism, and future communism. The corresponding systems of religious thought were pagan-classical, early Christian and Protestant, and the religion of socialism. Bax’s view was that Victorian capitalism was poised at a point of transition from this middle stage – the individualism of Protestantism – and that future communism and the religion of socialism would emerge in the next phase of development. As the transcendence of primitive communism and individualism, such a religion would bear the primary characteristics of primitive communism – duty and solidarity – but in a manner mediated by the history of individualism. In contrast to primitive communism, which was bounded by ties of blood or kinship, the religion of socialism would support a global, generalised duty based on the recognition of the equality of peoples.¹² Unlike individualism, which defined duty in relation to law – all too frequently giving rise to conflicts between individual moral responsibility and respect for rules – equality would resolve the tension between conscience and obedience.

In Morris’s writings it is difficult to find either a formal analysis of historical change or a full-blown account of moral development. Nevertheless, as A.L. Morton notes, Morris’s reflection on ‘the change beyond the change’ in A Dream of John Ball is rightly regarded as a description of ‘the dialectic of history’.¹³ In a long dialogue with John Ball, in the closing chapters of the book, Morris elaborated his view. Like Bax, he identified three movements in the dialectic, the first one negative. Morris tells John Ball that the King’s petitioners will ‘fight and lose the battle’ and the Revolt will be put down.¹⁴ The second is a partial reverse: ‘the thing they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant’. As Morris explains, the suppression of the revolt results in the abolition of the category of ‘villein’, and equality is granted to all. However, as the new freedom consists only of the formal right to sell ‘the power of … labour’ for a subsistence wage, changes in the terms of labour cement the status of the newly freed villeins as ‘thrall’.¹⁵ Morris tells Ball, ‘all power shall be in the hands of … foul swine’ and ‘times of plenty shall … be the times of famine’.¹⁶ The final movement is positive: the new tyranny is overcome as ‘other men … fight for what they meant under another name’.¹⁷ From his nineteenth century vantage, Morris identified this movement with the struggle for socialism. ‘[M] ake no mistake’ he wrote in Justice, ‘about the cause for which Wat Tyler and his worthier associate John Ball fell; they were fighting against the fleecing of the people by that particular form of fleecing then in fashion, viz.: serfdom or villeinage …’.¹⁸ The oppressed of the fourteenth-century could not think of themselves as socialists, but their cause was the same, and it was the duty of nineteenth-century revolutionaries to deliver the transformation they had been denied.
iii. philosophies of history

Given that the terms of Bax’s historical sociology found their way into the *Manifesto*, it seems reasonable to assume that Morris believed his own sketchier treatment of the dialectic was compatible with it. Yet Bax’s sociology was underpinned by a metaphysical philosophy absent from Morris’s historical account. Both men identified two main factors in historical change or what Bax, in a nod to Auguste Comte, called ‘social dynamics’: the ethical and the material. But whereas Bax’s philosophy suggested the impossibility of finding a model of socialist ethics in the past, Morris’s history pointed in precisely the opposite direction: the past held the key to the future. The explanation lies in their respective philosophical outlooks.

Bax called the ‘two main factors’ of historical development ‘outward material circumstance (mainly economic in its character)’ and ideas, expressed in the ‘the spontaneity of human intelligence’. These factors did not stand in causal relation to one another: Bax rejected the idea that historical change could be conceptualised as a parallel movement in which idealism somehow triggered or was triggered by material change. Instead he claimed that ‘history consists in the unity of these two lines in their action and reaction’ and that both had evolved autonomously, neither being ultimately reducible to the other. Bax also rejected the proposition that the evolution of ideas followed a logical path – a position he attributed to Hegel – making the possibility of their ‘mechanical determination’ conceivable. Human beings, he conceded, grasped history only by their reason, and therefore understood it as a rational process.

But it did not follow that history was in fact a process of Reason unfolding – in whatever relation it might be said to stand to the material forces with which it reacted. To believe this was to confuse the terms of history’s understanding with the process of its development and to assume wrongly, Bax argued, that individuals were first and foremost creatures of thought. This was not the case: they were primarily creatures of experience, will and feeling. Returning to the Cartesian roots of modern philosophy, he argued that the significance of the thinking being as a category for reflection did not rest in ‘the “intelligible” principle’ – thought – but in ‘the “I” which thinks’ – the passionate will. Following Schopenhauer (whose essays he translated), Bax referred to as this as the alogical element of knowledge, and identified it as the real driver of historical change.

Bax’s identification of the alogical or the will as the primary force, which realised itself through the complex interplay of ideal and material forces, shaped his image of history as a spiral, an idea which appeared not only in the Manifesto but in a number of his single-authored works. Though Bax would not have approved, his image resonated with classical science. Writing more than a hundred years earlier, Voltaire observed that Newton had demonstrated that an ‘infinitely lit-
tle’ change in the direction of a ‘finite line’ resulted in an ‘infinite curve’. With this wonderful new knowledge it was possible to contemplate ‘squares of infinity, cubes of infinity and infinite infinities’. Bax imagined something similar: ‘wheels’ of infinity powering changes in consciousness and material existence. His idea was that infinitely small expressions of will made it possible to comprehend the apparently linear path of history as an infinite progression, each complex movement representing a further stage in ethical development.

Morris’s treatment of the forces of historical development bore none of the hallmarks of Bax’s metaphysical philosophy, though he too argued that it was possible to identify material and ideal factors as dynamics of change. He also agreed that it was impossible to prioritise one over the other, as if in a causal relation. In *A Dream of John Ball*, he traced the broad outlines of historical development from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century. On the one hand, he examined the process of economic development, telling the resolute but incredulous John Ball about the rise of industry, mechanisation and the expansion of production, the de-skilling of labour and the emergence of a novel and terrible tyranny of work; the private appropriation of the common lands, the rise of a new idle class of owners and the skewing of the market towards the consumption of useless things. On the other, he explored concomitant changes in ideas and behaviours, comparing the heady aspirations of John Ball’s toilers to the cowed resignation of nineteenth-century workers. In John Ball’s eyes, the willingness of the latter to accept the fleecing of capitalism seemingly without complaint indicated a complicity in their own oppression. Morris agreed, but tempered this critique. Nineteenth century workers were not really the ‘sluggards, dolts, and cowards’ which John Ball condemned. They lacked the burning sense of injustice which had motivated their forebears because they had been seduced by capitalism’s competitive logic. Mistakenly regarding themselves as free men and equal to their masters, they had been pacified by the slim probability that they might emerge as beneficiaries of market exchange. Morris explained: they had been ‘blinded to the robbing of themselves by others, because they shall hope in their souls that they may each live to rob others’. 

According to this analysis, one of the key differences between fourteenth and nineteenth-century workers was historical luck. The development of material forces suggested that the latter stood at a point of potential transformation: capitalism was ripe for revolution. However there was another important difference between the two generations: moral courage. For nineteenth century workers, the windows of historical change were ajar, but, in contrast to John Ball’s men, they lacked the wherewithal to throw them open and force through the material and ethical changes which revolutionary socialism demanded. For fourteenth century peasants, the situation was the precisely the reverse. They possessed the will to fight injustice but, in material terms, they stood at the cusp of capitalism’s
initial development. So, although Morris believed that their cause was frustrated by their deference to, and misplaced trust in, their masters, the odds of achieving revolutionary change were always stacked against them.

By linking the struggles of fourteenth and nineteenth century peoples, Morris identified socialist ethics with past hope in a way which suggested continuity in history. On his understanding, the religion of socialism could not be conceptualised, as Bax imagined, as the result of a process of transcendence, linked to historical changes in consciousness, rooted in the endless, unpredictable expression of will. For Morris, the religion of socialism was the part of the transformation to socialism but it was also a principal factor motivating that transformation. Moreover, whilst will—or passion—played an important role in securing change, central to Morris’s view was a constant willingness to suffer defeat. To this extent, his understanding of history possessed more in common with traditional notions of eternity than with the fantastic possibilities of modern calculus.

In 1649, ‘free-born’ John Lilburne declared that the Levellers’ ‘cause and principles do through their own natural truth and lustre get ground in men’s understandings so that though we fail, our truths prosper. And posterity we doubt not shall reap the benefit of our endeavours’. For Morris too, because the memory of past actions was a driver for future hope, history played a key role in animating the will. Like Lilburne, Morris thus linked the capacity for action and the power of fellowship to an appreciation of the cyclical rhythms of nature: birth, death and re-birth. Men live, says Morris ‘because the world liveth’. Developing the theme, John Ball tells him that ‘this is but an old tale that men must die; and I will tell thee another, to wit, that they live; and I live now and shall live’. Morris agrees:

that though I die and end, yet mankind yet livesth, therefore I end not, since I am a man … or at the least even so thou doest, since now thou art ready to die in grief and torment rather than be unfaithful to the Fellowship, yea rather than fail to work thine utmost for it … And as thou doest, so now doth many a poor man unnamed and unknown, and shall do while the world lasteth: and they that do less than this, fail because of fear, and are ashamed of their cowardice, and make many tales to themselves to deceive themselves, lest they should grow too much ashamed to live.

It is possible to see how Morris could picture such movements of will in the terms which Bax preferred. The image of the spiral, which did not appear in Morris’s work, might as easily be seen to represent cycles in the struggle for fellowship over time as expressions of the alogical. But if the imagery worked for both men, this coincidence of view could not conceal their strong disagreement about the status of history as a source of knowledge for the future.
In a series of articles in *Commonweal*, later published as *Socialism: Its Growth and Outcome*, Morris and Bax re-examined the concept of historical change and future socialism. Apart from embellishing the argument about ethical development, they reasoned that because the past, on which any future projection is based, is also uncertain, the future is necessarily unknowable. However vivid and accurate history may appear, it can only be ‘our picture of the past’; not so much a ‘picture of what really took place’ as an image infused with ‘the present which we experience’. Knowing that history would progress, and being able to describe a process of historical change, could not, therefore, provide any insight into how the ethic of socialism might be realised and how tomorrow might appear. At best, it was possible to make informed guesses about which features of the present were likely to disappear, but it was pointless to speculate on the ways in which ‘the void’ might be filled.

Neither Bax nor Morris allowed claims about historical knowledge to inhibit their speculations. The chapters ‘Socialism Triumphant’ in *Socialism From the Root Up* give a fairly full sketch of their principal ideas. The picture presented in *Socialism Its Growth and Outcome* is even more elaborate, delving even into ‘petty’ issues of costume. In their single-authored work, too, they both left clear pictures of the ways in which they thought history might progress. Bax veered from dry planning to fantastic speculative philosophy. His essay ‘The Morrow of the Revolution’ (a title taken up by Morris in the opening of *News From Nowhere*) acknowledged the importance of discussing what socialists would do with power, were they ever to achieve it. In order to meet concerns about the need for practical policy, it outlined a number of likely initiatives. With closer attention to the spiral, Bax also set out his ideas about the likely future development of material and ideal forces. There was a strong possibility, he suggested, that the ‘direct influence’ of material factors on ‘spontaneous psychological movement’ might be reduced ‘to the minimum’. For the first time in human evolution, social change might be ‘consciously shaped by the will of man’.

Whilst Bax was prepared to think about the possibilities that the future might hold, his philosophy of history ruled against utopianism. Writing in 1891, the same year in which *News From Nowhere* was published, he wrote:

> The current popularity of Utopian romances, hailed with such joy by some, is not, perhaps, a very edifying sign. It indicates a demand for miracles … For it would be nothing less than a miracle for any human being to describe in prophetic vision the society of the future. What is effected in Utopian socialist writings is merely a travesty of the society of the present, or of the past. We can define,
that is, lay down, in the abstract, the general principles on which the society of the future will be based, but we cannot describe, that is, picture, in the concrete, any state of society of which the world has had no experience. For into the reality of a society, even in its broader details, there enters a large element of contingency, of alogicality, of unreason, with which no general principles will furnish us. In consequence of this, the detail, the reality, has to be supplied by the Utopian romancer, from states of society already realised in the past or the present. The new principles are then superimposed upon a basis already formed of old principles, and a hybrid pseudo-reality is produced, which is neither past, present, nor future.

Bax’s hostility to utopianism can be explained by his metaphysics. Believing that historical change was predicated on the behaviours of wilful beings acting in particular contexts, and that reason could only capture the outward appearance of the changes that they brought into being, he also believed that social evolution could only be known as a process: its inner content or what, following Schopenhauer, Bax called its ‘presentment’, was by definition unknowable. In Problems of Mind and Morals he explained:

To obtain a true presentment of any period of history we should, of course, have to identify the content of our consciousness with the content of a consciousness of a past age. This is what the historical imagination endeavours to attain. But such reconstruction as the historical imagination by means of research and archaeological lore can effect, must obviously remain, in its total result, an artificial product, since its correspondence with fact cannot be controlled by a reference to the living reality. And, again, the living reality itself is different, according to the facet from which it is regarded. Each individual lives in his own world, albeit that world at once conditions and is conditioned by the conception which enters into it of the general world of the time … The reproduction of the past in this latter sense … is a matter of feeling and, to a large extent, immediate intuition.

One implication of Bax’s view was that the ambition of conventional truth-seeking historians would forever be frustrated. His scepticism was not just that ‘historical narrative and historical romance’ could be placed in one category, but that whatever form it assumed, historical study could only ever serve as a ‘medium of picture-writing’. The purpose of the historian was to evoke an atmosphere or an impression of a past consciousness, the feelings and sentiments which Bax associated with the alogical. At best, history was properly a subject for art. In this spirit, Bax identified Wagner as one of the nineteenth-century’s pre-eminent historians; in Die Meistersinger, Wagner reproduced ‘the atmosphere of a past age in the art of the present’. ‘We feel’, Bax generalised, ‘that the music brings us in contact with the consciousness of the late mediaeval German city. We feel that
it touches in us some nerve in our consciousness that reawakens an echo of the consciousness of that remote time.  

Morris certainly did not share Bax’s assessment of Wagner, though he permitted similar reference to the genius of Die Meistersinger in their joint-authored work, and his idea of history, though easily categorised as romance and perhaps a form of art, was also at odds with Bax’s view. His public agreement with Bax that the knowledge of history was always restricted by the boundaries of present, did not suggest to him an impossibility of attaining historical knowledge. In News From Nowhere, he gives his fictional characters knowledge of nineteenth-century history: of woodland management in Epping Forest, and the events of 1887 in Trafalgar Square. The extended conversation between Guest and Old Hammond is similarly predicated on the future generation’s accurate grasp of nineteenth-century policies, behaviours and practices. In an exchange concerning the value of nineteenth century scholarship, Morris observes that ‘history’ – by which he means future understandings of his nineteenth-century present – has ‘reversed contemporary judgments’, but he does not impugn the validity of Old Hammond’s account of education.

As if to highlight the value of history which his presence in the novel affirms, Morris also uses his position to force the future generation to reflect on their loss of historical memory, and to question the adequacy of their narrow concern with the present. Old Hammond tells him that his own ‘tales of the past’ bore the young. ‘The last harvest, the last baby, the last knot of carving in the market-place, is history enough for them’. Born at yet another remove from the dystopia of the mid-twentieth century, the young possess the assurance ‘of peace and continuous plenty’ and entertain no wish to be reminded of the past. Dick confirms Old Hammond’s view: ‘it is mostly in periods of turmoil and strife and confusion that people care much about history and ... we are not like that now.’ Morris’s fear – which he shares with Ellen – is that by insulating themselves from the past, the future generation leave themselves badly exposed to the possible reverses of history and the loss of utopia gained. Understanding Morris’s concerns and realising the lessons of oppression his stories of the past contain, she remarks ‘that is not stated clearly enough in our history books, and it is worth knowing.’

Morris might have agreed with Bax that his idea of the past was as romantic as his image of the future – the facts might always be questioned and it was impossible to build a complete picture of either. He might also have agreed that judgments about social practices change over time. Nevertheless, and contrary to Bax, Morris gave history content, and believed that it was possible to use it in order to reflect both on the condition of the present and the possibilities for the future. To this extent, history was a source of knowledge: the knowledge of what tomorrow should be.
NOTES

15. Ibid., p. 97.
16. Ibid., p. 100.
17. Ibid., p. 53.


23. For a discussion of qualitative improvement and the spiral, see Bax, *Schopenhauer*, pp. li–liii.


27. Morton, p. 87.


32. *Growth and Outcome*, p. 311.


35. Ernest Belfort Bax, *Outlooks From the New Standpoint*, Preface, para. 3; available at [http://www.marxists.org/archive/bax/1891/outlooks/00-preface.htm](http://www.marxists.org/archive/bax/1891/outlooks/00-preface.htm) [last accessed 16 October 2009].


38. Salmon, *Political Writings*, p. 611.


Author’s Note: I would like to thank Florence and William Boos for testing some of the arguments presented in this paper; and I am grateful to the two anonymous referees who read an earlier version and thank them for their thoughtful and constructive criticism.